On March 6, two mouthfuls of organizations that do very little, the China National Democratic Construction Association (中国民主建国会) and All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (全国工商业联合会), had a meeting on the sidelines of China’s “Two Sessions”1 to ostentibly talk about private industry. President Xi, as is his wont, gave a speech that began by sunnily recounting manifold CCP achievements in 2022. But then, he unexpectedly veered into a dark alley and described the challenging international environment facing China. Xi noted that the past five years have been “extremely unusual and extraordinary” due to severe changes in the outside environment, such as increasing uncertainty and unpredictability. This outside environment is particularly the result of “all around containment, encirclement, and suppression by Western countries led by the US.”
Xi then uttered a new aphorism, twenty four small characters that could guide Chinese foreign policy for 24 (or 10, or 26) more years. As others have written, rhetorical formulations (提法) are critical ways for the CCP leadership to manage the cadres, and analysts can use them to track evolution of core beliefs—as well as core debates—within the party.
Xi’s new phrase is:
“remain calm, maintain composure, make progress while ensuring stability, actively accomplish things, unite as one, and dare to struggle”
沉着冷静、保持定力,稳中求进、积极作为,团结一致、敢于斗争
The meanings of this slogan are further clarified by Xi later on in the same speech. I have translated the following paragraph fully because I think it is sufficiently important. As with all of my translations, please note that I am not a native Mandarin speaker, and inaccuracies may result.
Remain calm and maintain composure, means that we must: look calmly at the profound changes in the international situation; be unperturbed in looking upon all sorts of risks and challenges; accurately recognize changes, scientifically respond to changes, take the initiative to seek change; and improve adjustments of strategic policies in a timely manner. Additionally, we must maintain strategic composure, be as resilient and determined as a bamboo shoot clinging to the side of a mountain,2 do not be afraid of various risks, flow towards fixed strategic objectives, and unswervingly march forward. Make progress while ensuring stability and actively accomplish things, means that: the overall direction must be stable; the guidelines and policy must be stable; the strategy and deployment must be stable; on the basis of holding fast to the foundations and stabilizing the frontline, actively make advancements; do not stop, go as fast as you are able; seek out the best result. Unite as one, and dare to struggle. Power originates from unity. In recent years, we have faced all sorts of risks and challenges one after another, big battles again and again; each one was only overcome with the unified struggle and tenacious struggle of the entire people. For the coming period, the risks and challenges we face will only increase in number and become more and more severe. Only if the entire people think with one mind and work with one heart, cross the river in the same boat and unite their wills into a fortress, dare to struggle and are good at struggle, will we be able to continuously attain even greater victories. (emphasis mine)
沉着冷静、保持定力,就是要冷静观察国际局势的深刻变动,沉着应对各种风险挑战,既准确识变、科学应变、主动求变,及时优化调整战略策略,又保持战略定力,咬定青山不放松,不为各种风险所惧,朝着既定的战略目标,坚定不移向前进。稳中求进、积极作为,就是大方向要稳,方针政策要稳,战略部署要稳,在守住根基、稳住阵脚的基础上积极进取,不停步、能快则快,争取最好结果。团结一致、敢于斗争。力量源于团结。这些年来,我们面临的各种风险挑战接踵而至,大仗一个接一个,每一仗都是靠全体人民团结奋斗、顽强斗争闯过来的。未来一个时期,我们面临的风险挑战只会越来越多、越来越严峻。只有全体人民心往一处想、劲往一处使,同舟共济、众志成城,敢于斗争、善于斗争,才能不断夺取新的更大胜利。
Proceeding from Precedence
The obvious point of comparison for Xi’s slogan is Deng Xiaoping’s famous “24 character strategy,” which goes as follows:
“observe calmly, stabilize the frontline, cope with affairs calmly, hide brightness and cherish obscurity, be good at keeping a low profile, never claim leadership, accomplish something”
冷静观察,稳住阵脚,沉着应付,韬光养晦,善于守拙,决不当头,有所作为3
Mysteriously, the exact history of the formulation of this phrase is shrouded in obscurity. The best two accounts I have seen are in Rush Doshi’s book the Long Game (chapter three) and in an article by Chinese international relations scholars Chen Dingding and Wang Jianwei.4 According to them, essentially, Deng used 12 character of this phrase in a 1989 speech, then used 韬光养晦 (taoguangyanghui) on its own in a 1992 speech, and these phrases eventually evolved via uncertain means into a “24 character” or “28 character” principle by the late 1990s or early 2000s. In the 1989 usage, the three phrases of “冷静观察,稳住阵脚,沉着应付” are further explained by Deng saying: “Do not rush and you can’t afford to rush. Must be calm, calm, and even more calm, be immersed in good work, do well in one issue—our own affairs" (不要急 ,也急不得 。要冷静、冷静、再冷静,埋头实干,做好一件事,我们自己的事).5
Rush Doshi argues persuasively that the adoption of a low-profile and conservative approach to diplomacy was a strategy that resulted from China’s weak international position and always subject to change. While that makes sense, I am less convinced by the arguments of some that China’s pursuit of “hide and bide” was always intended to position China to overthrow the US-led world order and establish its own system. Nevertheless, the “hide and bide” strategy did dominate Chinese foreign policy, for decades, with only small adjustments under the Jiang, Hu, and Xi administrations (also explained well in Rush Doshi’s book). For instance, a speech given by then Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan before the 16th CCP Party Congress in 2002 stated that the CCP had implemented Deng’s instructional guidelines (the 24 character strategy) between 1989 and 1993. However, references to the policy continue beyond 1993, and Deng’s successors are generally understood to have only modified the guidelines at first.
Rush Doshi argues that Xi Jinping used the phrase “profound changes unseen in the last century” [百年未有之大变局], to replace Deng’s formulation in 2017, but I find this less compelling given that “profound changes” describes a state of the world rather than providing a foreign policy prescription. In addition, the CCP’s view of “profound changes,” which perhaps reached a triumphalist crest around 2020-2021, has become much more pessimistic and nuanced in the past two years due to intensifying US efforts to revitalize itself and kneecap China.
The New 24 Character Strategy
When we compare Deng and Xi’s phrases in the below table, it is clear that Xi is making a major update Deng’s phrase, including by taking out more than half of the previous content.
As you can see from the comparison, there are three four-character Chinese phrases removed from Deng’s aphorism, and three added to Xi’s. The phrases that Xi chose not to retain are all aboutChina’s assertiveness and international role, which argued for China to avoid international leadership so as to not draw attention to itself or distract from addressing domestic issues. Instead, the phrases added by Xi focus primarily on two ideas: 1) doing more 2) preparing for struggle. Xi makes clear that leadership and strategy must be stable, but that China must simultaneously try to make as many gains as constraints allow—a tricky balance to strike. Meanwhile, in his call for unity, Xi stated that “for the coming period, the risks and challenges we face will only increase in number and become more and more severe.” He clearly sees a grim international environment, requiring complete within the polity in order to fight to victory.
To my surprise, I am not aware of any high profile academics writing commentaries or explainers of this new phrase (as of the evening of Sunday, March 13). Instead, all we have that is mildly substantive is an op-ed in the People’s Daily by a special editorial team6 and some quotations on the party construction (党建) website.
The People’s Daily article says that Xi’s phrase both summarizes learning from the past and reveals the methods for success in the future. The op-ed further underscores that China faces major tests and a more complex situation. Therefore, China must unite under the party into a “piece of unyielding steel,” strengthen ambition, backbone, and confidence, and open up a new world of development through struggle. Meanwhile, the party construction article associates “remain calm and maintain composure” with understanding the changes and contradictions within “profound changes unseen in the last century” so as to turn crises into opportunities and improve medium and long term planning. It links the phrase “make progress while ensuring stability and actively accomplish things” with balancing economic security against economic reforms. Lastly, it implies that all ethnic groups and non-party members must unite for China to emerge victorious.
Implications and Chinese threat perceptions
This new formulation by Xi does not stand as a single, isolated data point. Rather, several other key data points in recent months hint that the CCP’s threat perceptions have darkened—and it is possible that the party has cast off the received wisdom of previous decades.
In the 20th Party Congress work report in October 2022, President Xi omitted the declarations that “peace and development” are the “theme of the times” and that China’s development is in an “important period of strategic opportunity,” which were rhetorical mainstays for the last 35 and 20 years respectively. As analysts at the Center for Advanced China Research argued, “the change does suggest that they [CCP leaders] believe that the prospect of war is now greater than at any point in the last 35 years.”
During the March 6 speech by Xi mentioned at the beginning of this article, Xi unusually named the US as a leader of containment efforts against China.
Then, in a press conference on March 7, Foreign Minister Qin Gang alarmingly declared “if the United States does not hit the brake but continues to speed down the wrong path, no amount of guardrails can prevent derailing, and there will surely be conflict and confrontation.” In his answer, FM Qin makes clear that he sees the US as fully responsible for the deterioration in the US-China relationship.
Three data points do make a trend, but there are some counterarguments against reading too much into the new 24 character phrase. The venue for releasing it is somewhat random—a meeting with some societal groups on the sidelines of the Two Sessions. In addition, the formulation received a surprising lack of commentary in the week since the release of the phrase. The two main explainers (one People’s Daily and one in “party construction”) have been reposted in many other outlets, but I would have expected more unique reports. Also, it is possible this phrase could face the same lame fate as previous much-ballyhooed ideas that remain ill-defined years later, like “a new type of great power relations” (新型大国关系)and the “community of common destiny for humankind” (人类命运共同体). But on the contrary, this was the lead item on the CCTV evening news that day, so it did receive emphasis in propaganda. Given the seemingly muddled documentation around the origins of Deng’s 24 character aphorism, maybe we should not expect to see this phrase to be plastered everywhere, even if it is important. And the major foreign policy phrases listed above were more clearly outward focused and useful for negotiation with other countries, whereas this phrase is internal guidance for the party.
My current best guess is that 1) this phrase is important 2) it replaces Deng’s famous phrase and 3) it indicates increasing threat perception by CCP leaders that possibly no amount of US reassurance could mollify. While I am rather confident in 1) and 2) given the structure of the phrase and its similarity to Deng’s phrase, I am much less certain about 3) – and I really do not want to believe that 3) is true. To test my hypothesis, I forecast that there is an 80% chance that Xi Jinping, Wang Yi, or Qin Gang uses this full phrase in a official speech, essay, or other appearance before April 2024. Unfortunately, I am not sure if I can give a falsifiable, numerical forecast on claim 3) at the moment.
To end on an element of levity, I welcome folks to comment with their best two word summary of Xi’s new foreign policy formulation. Whoever came up with “hide and bide” for Deng was a genius—it is bite-sized, has a nice ring, and conveys key ideas. The best I can think of so far is “unite and fight.” Good luck!
The annual meeting of China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, and an affiliated government advisory body, the China People’s Political Consultative Conference.
Quoting from a Qing poem, https://so.gushiwen.cn/mingju/juv_d6f81c48c162.aspx
“有所作为” was added later on.
Chen, Dingding, and Jianwei Wang. "Lying Low No More?: China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy." China: An International Journal 9, no. 2 (2011): 195-216. doi:10.1353/chn.2011.0013. You can email me if you want a copy.
改 革 开 放 政 策 稳 定 ,中 国 大 有 希 望, in the Selected works of Deng Xiaoping Volume 3 (邓小平文选 第三卷) page 321. https://deyu.usst.edu.cn/_upload/article/files/c2/ea/220a941a4adf8c1690aa6c434fe2/89a5d5ba-3e80-4ffc-b5e6-c8f98429cffa.pdf
仲音, or Zhong yin, which in accordance with longstanding People’s Daily practice, is a homonym most likely meaning 重要声音, or important voice, representing leadership viewpoints and previously writing mostly on COVID policy