There is darkness, but will there be a dawn?

In my previous post, I voiced worries that US and Chinese elite perceptions of the other country may have reached a point of no return and misperceptions may be uncorrectable. China might confidently believe that the US is hellbent upon preventing China’s rise and defeating the CCP. Conversely, American views that the CCP is methodically attempting to dismantle the American-led liberal, rules-based international order may be irreversible.

Peking University’s esteemed America expert Wang Jisi thinks that we have in fact crossed the tipping point. Lianhe Zaobao, the largest Chinese language outlet in Singapore, reported comments made by Wang during a lecture to Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). While I am unable to confirm the veracity of the reporting, Wang did give a speech to RSIS on the date claimed.

The core idea in the speech was that negative perceptions by both the US and China have hardened. Each country believes that the actions of the other country are intended to counter its own interests, and domestic political incentives make it near-impossible to change these views.

Some choice quotes from the article include:

Famed Chinese scholar Wang Jisi stated that the crux of the downturn in US-China relations lies in domestic political problems, and it will be difficult for additional dialogues to improve bilateral relations. China already does not hold out any hope for improvement in US-China relations.

中国著名学者王缉思说，中美关系恶化的症结在于各自的国内政治问题，再多的对话都难推动两国关系改善，中国也已不对改善中美关系抱任何期望。

“They [the US] condemn China, and they have their political correctness. We [China] condemn the US, and we also have our own political correctness.”

“他们谴责中国，有他们的政治正确性，我们谴责美国也有我们的政治正确定性。”

Due to the effect of domestic politics, it is extremely difficult for the US or China to improve the attitude of the other party. Wang Jisi pessimistically concludes that it will be difficult for additional dialogues to improve bilateral relations. He also very confidently stated that China already does not hold out any hope for improvement in US-China relations.

‘I discussed previously with some decision-makers, and they said, how is it possible for us to improve relations with those countries that want to contain China.’

因为国内政治的关系，中美双方要改变彼此的态度都很困难。王缉思悲观认为，再多对话也难推动中美关系改善。他也表示很有把握地说，中国已不对改善中美关系抱任何期望。

‘我和一些决策者谈过，他们说，对那些试图遏制中国的国家，我们要怎么改善关系？’

Wang also referenced Xi Jinping’s comments to two industry associations on March 6, the subject of my last article. Regarding those comments, Wang Jisi said that this discussion by Xi can be interpreted in multiple ways. Wang believes that the meaning of China’s leadership is, “US containment has caused some problems for China domestically. Not all problems, but a large portion of them are related to the US.” [他个人认为，中国领导人的言下之意是，“美国的遏制导致中国国内遇到一些问题。不是所有问题，但大部分问题都与美国相关。”]

A longtime American analyst of the Chinese economy also expressed a similar view when reflecting upon his trip to China for the China Development Forum (CDF) in March 2023.¹ Yale fellow Stephen Roach, a former Morgan Stanley economist, said that the consensus in China is that “very little that can be done to arrest this worrisome downward spiral in the world’s most important bilateral relationship.” As a result, China is more focused on its own domestic policy as well as global governance projects that do not involve the US. Thankfully, Roach did not find any evidence that “China that has given up hope and is now preparing for a far more dangerous phase of conflict escalation—kinetic military action.” And yet, if Chinese leaders have concluded that they can do little to change US opinions, then they have no reason to even attempt to mollify their policies.

Banging heads against a wall?

The few surviving US advocates of engagement with China are arguably banging their heads against a steel wall. No, I don’t mean Xi’s “Great Wall of steel,” though that is certainly part of the problem. Fundamentally, decisionmakers on both sides increasingly see little upside in meaningful dialogue and are skeptical of those who would advise caution. What do you expect given the extreme rhetoric of the House Select Committee on the CCP or China’s use of delaying or cancelling dialogues reluctance as leverage (I read the Chinese MOFA spokesperson’s response to a question about delays in Blinken’s trip as essentially confirming the Politico reporting, since the spokesperson didn’t actually refute the reporting but simply blamed the US for creating a bad atmosphere).

In fact, if both sides’ views are almost unchangeable due to either hardening assessments or domestic political factors, then one could make a case that it is best to gird for conflict. That vision claims that the best way to avoid conflict and secure American interests is to deter conventional conflict through an arms buildup and deny China influence in other regions or international institutions. That will sound reasonable to some, and certainly there do need to be some people with this approach in the US. However, I content that this mental framing has excessively dominated the discourse. We still need people to try and see if there are ways to rekindle discussion and dialogue, find novel ways to achieve common interest through negotiation, and figure out if better outcomes can be achieved for citizens of the US and the Earth. So much is at stake: world war three is unthinkably terrifying; climate issues can be tackled partially by individual domestic efforts but would benefit from global unity; emerging technologies including advanced AI and synthetic biology pose major potential transnational threats.

At the same time, we have to be mindful of our limitations and realistic in our objectives. Obviously relations are not going back to the Obama or Bush years. But, we can still try to increase predictability, reduce risks of conflict, and ensure that the global order is meeting the needs of all countries. Wang Jisi himself seems willing to continue trying. Just last week, he co-authored a report and accompanying Foreign Affairs op-ed on the importance of scholarly exchange and person to person relations between the US and China along with CSIS’s Scott Kennedy. To some extent, his speech at RSIS probably indicates that he is more pessimistic  now than he was when writing the report—since I would guess he had conceptualized much of the content a month or more ago. However, regardless of how dire the situation appears, Wang is inclined to still strive for better outcomes rather than hang up his hat. He still has hope that dialogues can be useful, have a place, and should be restored from their COVID-era nadir, even if they are unlikely to massively improve relations. Ultimately, expanding and restoring dialogue it is a low cost, low probability, and high payoff bet. In the words of the authors:

“For the foreseeable future, relations are most likely to continue deteriorating. And it would be naive to believe that renewed communication would necessarily yield increased mutual appreciation or respect; indeed, more knowledge could also reinforce negative views and add to tensions. But at a minimum, talking—and listening—would increase the chances that the two countries will find ways to peacefully manage their differences.”

I plan to write some additional posts on things I think the US could do to try to improve US-China relations. I actually think that there are some low hanging fruit that the Biden administration has chosen not to pursue. More next time!

PS: I plan to start making some use of Substack Notes, which is sort of like a replacement for Twitter. I plan to start “noting” more about the intersection of AI in China and foreign policy.

“the darkness before the dawn in traditional chinese landscape painting style” with DALLE

1. CDF is a high-level Chinese government sponsored gathering sometimes analogized as China’s “Davos,” where foreign business executives and scholars get access to Chinese government leaders.